• DocumentCode
    2573493
  • Title

    The incentive idiosyncrasy of the comparative-performance-option and its incentive effect to managers

  • Author

    Liu, Guo-mai ; Tan, Yi-qun

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Eng. Manage., Fujian Univ. of Technol., Fuzhou, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    27-29 June 2011
  • Firstpage
    1815
  • Lastpage
    1818
  • Abstract
    The sensitivity of the option value to stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of the option value to stock return volatility (vega) are selected as the analysis parameters of executive stock option. Delta increases with stock price rising and vega decreases with stock return volatility rising. By contrast with the traditional executive stock option, the delta of the comparative-performance-option is large and the vega of the comparative-performance-option is small. The delta of the comparative-performance-option is smaller as the scheduled time is longer. The comparative-performance-option can incentive executive to work hard and restrain executive to gamble is proved , and the limitation of the comparative-performance-option is discussed.
  • Keywords
    pricing; comparative-performance-option; delta; executive stock option; incentive effect; incentive executive; incentive idiosyncrasy; option value; restrain executive; stock price; stock return volatility; vega; Contracts; Corporate acquisitions; Economics; Finance; Presses; Sensitivity; executive compensation; gamble behavior; management performance; stock option incentive; the comparative-performance-option;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Science and Service System (CSSS), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Nanjing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-9762-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSSS.2011.5972104
  • Filename
    5972104