DocumentCode
2573493
Title
The incentive idiosyncrasy of the comparative-performance-option and its incentive effect to managers
Author
Liu, Guo-mai ; Tan, Yi-qun
Author_Institution
Dept. of Eng. Manage., Fujian Univ. of Technol., Fuzhou, China
fYear
2011
fDate
27-29 June 2011
Firstpage
1815
Lastpage
1818
Abstract
The sensitivity of the option value to stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of the option value to stock return volatility (vega) are selected as the analysis parameters of executive stock option. Delta increases with stock price rising and vega decreases with stock return volatility rising. By contrast with the traditional executive stock option, the delta of the comparative-performance-option is large and the vega of the comparative-performance-option is small. The delta of the comparative-performance-option is smaller as the scheduled time is longer. The comparative-performance-option can incentive executive to work hard and restrain executive to gamble is proved , and the limitation of the comparative-performance-option is discussed.
Keywords
pricing; comparative-performance-option; delta; executive stock option; incentive effect; incentive executive; incentive idiosyncrasy; option value; restrain executive; stock price; stock return volatility; vega; Contracts; Corporate acquisitions; Economics; Finance; Presses; Sensitivity; executive compensation; gamble behavior; management performance; stock option incentive; the comparative-performance-option;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Science and Service System (CSSS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Nanjing
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-9762-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSSS.2011.5972104
Filename
5972104
Link To Document