Unconditionally private and reliable communication in an untrusted network

Author

Desmedt, Yvo

Author_Institution

Univ. Coll. London

fYear

2005

fDate

19-19 Oct. 2005

Firstpage

38

Lastpage

41

Abstract

Most successful attacks that occur today against computer networks are targeted against the computers connected to the network, but not against the routers. At the BlackHat 2005 conference it was shown that potential attacks against routers are far from hypothetical. Current TCP/IP protocols (even including IPSEC) do not have the resilience to deal with routers taken over by the adversary. We survey the research done in the area of how to communicate reliably and/or privately. In the presence of different types of adversary, for example a malicious (Byzantine) one. Evidently, if the adversary can control all nodes (routers) in the network, no solution exists. The nodes that can be attacked by the adversary can be described using a threshold, or by what is called an adversary structure. The type of networks studied are point-to-point or broadcast/multicast

Keywords

computer networks; multicast communication; telecommunication network reliability; telecommunication network routing; telecommunication security; virtual private networks; adversary structure; broadcast network; communication reliability; computer networks; multicast network; point-to-point network; private communication; routers; Broadcasting; Computer network reliability; Computer networks; Context; Educational institutions; Intelligent networks; Protocols; Resilience; TCPIP; Telecommunication network reliability;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Theory and Practice in Information-Theoretic Security, 2005. IEEE Information Theory Workshop on

Conference_Location

Awaji Island

Print_ISBN

0-7803-9491-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ITWTPI.2005.1543954

Filename

1543954