Title :
Iterative procurement combinatorial auction based on price-quality bidding
Author :
Huang, He ; Chen, Jian ; Xu, Hongyan
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. Bus. Adm., Chongqing Univ., Chongqing
fDate :
June 30 2008-July 2 2008
Abstract :
We design an iterative procurement combinatorial auction (CA) rules based on price-quality bidding pattern, then construct the conception ldquocompetitive equilibrium scorerdquo (CES) to formulate optimization problem for the quality-related CA mechanism. By applying CES and a linear program plus its dual, we model the objective function as allocation efficiency and constraints according to the auction rules. The model implements a primal-dual algorithm for the auction, computing a feasible primal and a feasible dual that satisfy complementary slackness conditions when auction terminates, meanwhile allocation efficiency is achieved in the iterative procurement CA.
Keywords :
commerce; iterative methods; linear programming; pricing; procurement; allocation efficiency; auction rules; combinatorial auction; competitive equilibrium score; complementary slackness conditions; feasible dual; feasible primal; iterative procurement; linear program; objective function; optimization problem; price-quality bidding; primal-dual algorithm; Algorithm design and analysis; Complexity theory; Content addressable storage; Cost accounting; Design optimization; Forward contracts; Helium; Iterative algorithms; Procurement; Size measurement; Combinatorial auction; Iterative auction; Mechanism design; Procurement auction;
Conference_Titel :
Service Systems and Service Management, 2008 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Melbourne, VIC
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1671-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1672-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICSSSM.2008.4598555