DocumentCode :
2596803
Title :
A processor architecture defense against buffer overflow attacks
Author :
McGregor, John P. ; Karig, David K. ; Shi, Zhijie ; Lee, Ruby B.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Princeton Univ., NJ, USA
fYear :
2003
fDate :
11-13 Aug. 2003
Firstpage :
243
Lastpage :
250
Abstract :
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the memory stack continue to pose serious threats to network and computer security. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a malicious party can strategically overwrite the return address of a procedure call, obtain control of a system, and subsequently launch more virulent attacks. Software countermeasures for such intrusions entail modifications to applications, compilers, and operating systems. Despite the availability of these defenses, many systems remain vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. We present a hardware-based solution that prevents buffer overflow attacks involving procedure return address corruption. We add a secure return address stack to the processor that provides built-in, dynamic protection against return address tampering without requiring any effort by users or application programmers. Also, the performance impact is negligible for most applications. Changes are not required of application source code, so both legacy and future software can enjoy the security benefits of this solution.
Keywords :
buffer storage; computer architecture; security of data; buffer overflow attack prevention; computer security; network security; procedure call; processor architecture; secure procedure return address; Application software; Buffer overflow; Computer architecture; Computer security; Computer worms; Hardware; Internet; Operating systems; Proposals; Protection;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Technology: Research and Education, 2003. Proceedings. ITRE2003. International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-7724-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ITRE.2003.1270612
Filename :
1270612
Link To Document :
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