DocumentCode
2601630
Title
Research on post-bidding bundle strategy for online reverse auction
Author
Da-yong, Hu ; Yu-qiang, Feng
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Nov. 2010
Firstpage
51
Lastpage
57
Abstract
Currently online reverse auction (e-RA) is often used in procurement. However, winner determination problem (WDP) is NP-hard problem and practical use is difficult. As a research focus, `bundling´ is an effective way to cut down the complexity of WDP for e-RA, and often applied in practice. Although there are some qualitative researches in this field, quantitative bundling is still a problem. This paper designs post-bidding bundle strategy (PBBS) for e-RA to focus on this issue. Based on mathematical model and the bidding data from suppliers, this strategy uses `item similarity´ and `market competitiveness´ to measure the possibility of two items in the same bundle. Specially, item similarity measure refers to two classic methods in scientometrics: Salton and Jaccard. Finally, as shown with the 7th pharmaceutical centralized purchasing bidding data in china, this strategy of bundling has good theoretical value and practical significance in quantitative bundling.
Keywords
electronic commerce; optimisation; pharmaceutical industry; procurement; China; NP-hard problem; item similarity; market competitiveness; online reverse auction; pharmaceutical centralized purchasing bidding data; post-bidding bundle strategy; procurement; scientometrics:; winner determination problem; Companies; Complexity theory; Drugs; Joints; Procurement; Sugar; PBBS; WDP; bundle; e-RA; scientometrics;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Melbourne, VIC
ISSN
2155-1847
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8116-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSE.2010.5719784
Filename
5719784
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