How to price knowledge goods

It is difficult to price knowledge goods. This article uses the bargaining game model and the double auction game model to analyze the process of knowledge pricing. First of all, under the conditions of complete information, the analysis on the course of the pricing game showed that the seller can only get one-fourth of the total surplus utmost when the buyer is stronger than the seller; the benefit of the seller depends on the renewal rate of knowledge in this field when the seller is stronger than the buyer; the two sides will share the total surplus when the power of the two sides is balance and the renewal rate of knowledge is very slow. Secondly, under the conditions of incomplete information, the proportion of distribution in the total surplus of each side will depend on the relationship of trust and knowledge distance between the two sides. Finally, through the analysis of the game mechanism, the mechanism to allow the both sides tell their true valuation of the knowledge is founded that the price of the knowledge goods should be equal to the multiply of the each side´s valuation of knowledge divided by the sum of their valuation.