A Game Model of Tradable Pollution Emission Permits Based on Bilateral Auction

Author

Rao, Congjun ; Zhang, Zhongcheng ; Liu, Huanbin ; Li, Chuanfeng

Author_Institution

Coll. of Math. & Inf. Sci., Huanggang Normal Univ., Huanggang

fYear

2008

fDate

18-20 June 2008

Firstpage

249

Lastpage

249

Abstract

Pollution emission permits trade is an environment policy to control pollution by using economic means, and it will lead to achieve the optimal allocation for regional environmental funds and the total environment capacity. Based on the bilateral auction under conditions of incomplete information, a game model of tradable emission permits is established. By solving Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium bidding strategies of the bargainers are obtained. These results will provide valuable theoretical basis and guidance method for building the pollution emission permits trade system.

Keywords

Bayes methods; economics; environmental management; game theory; pollution; pollution control; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; bilateral auction; economic; environment policy; equilibrium bidding strategies; game model; pollution control; regional environmental funds allocation; total environment capacity allocation; tradable pollution emission permits trade; Bayesian methods; Costs; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Environmental management; Information science; Mathematics; Nash equilibrium; Pollution; Systems engineering and theory;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Innovative Computing Information and Control, 2008. ICICIC '08. 3rd International Conference on

Conference_Location

Dalian, Liaoning

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-3161-8

Electronic_ISBN

978-0-7695-3161-8

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICICIC.2008.34

Filename

4603438