Title :
A Game Model of Tradable Pollution Emission Permits Based on Bilateral Auction
Author :
Rao, Congjun ; Zhang, Zhongcheng ; Liu, Huanbin ; Li, Chuanfeng
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Math. & Inf. Sci., Huanggang Normal Univ., Huanggang
Abstract :
Pollution emission permits trade is an environment policy to control pollution by using economic means, and it will lead to achieve the optimal allocation for regional environmental funds and the total environment capacity. Based on the bilateral auction under conditions of incomplete information, a game model of tradable emission permits is established. By solving Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium bidding strategies of the bargainers are obtained. These results will provide valuable theoretical basis and guidance method for building the pollution emission permits trade system.
Keywords :
Bayes methods; economics; environmental management; game theory; pollution; pollution control; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; bilateral auction; economic; environment policy; equilibrium bidding strategies; game model; pollution control; regional environmental funds allocation; total environment capacity allocation; tradable pollution emission permits trade; Bayesian methods; Costs; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Environmental management; Information science; Mathematics; Nash equilibrium; Pollution; Systems engineering and theory;
Conference_Titel :
Innovative Computing Information and Control, 2008. ICICIC '08. 3rd International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Dalian, Liaoning
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3161-8
Electronic_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3161-8
DOI :
10.1109/ICICIC.2008.34
