DocumentCode
2660656
Title
How to share the cost of cooperating queues in a tandem network?
Author
Timmer, Judith ; Scheinhardt, Werner
Author_Institution
Dept. of Appl. Math., Univ. of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 Sept. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
7
Abstract
We consider networks of queues in which the different operators of individual queues may cooperate to reduce the amount of waiting. More specifically, as a first step we focus on Jackson tandem networks in which the total capacity of the servers can be redistributed over all queues in any desired way. If we associate a cost to waiting that is linear in the queue lengths, it is not difficult to see that the long run total cost is minimized when the operators equally share the available service capacity. The main question we try to answer is whether or not (the operators of) the individual queues will indeed cooperate in this way, and if so, how they will share the cost in the new situation. We find answers to this question for two- and three-node networks.
Keywords
channel capacity; queueing theory; Jackson tandem networks; cooperating queues; servers; service capacity; three-node networks; two-node networks; Focusing; Game theory; Games; Mathematics; Queueing analysis; Resource management; Servers; capacity allocation; cooperation; cost allocation; game theory; tandem queue;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Teletraffic Congress (ITC), 2010 22nd International
Conference_Location
Amsterdam
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8837-7
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-8835-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ITC.2010.5608712
Filename
5608712
Link To Document