Notice of RetractionImpact of decision preference on outsourcing service competition equilibrium

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

The paper analyzes the equilibrium of outsourcing service competition with decision preference. Constructing the contest model of outsourcing service competition, it explores the impact of decision preference on the equilibrium. The conclusion shows that the decision preference not only makes the equilibrium service level of the suppliers different, but also almost impact on both total equilibrium service level of the suppliers and the equilibrium average service level acquired by the purchaser. When the purchaser is disable to make by itself, it will diminish the equilibrium service level and total equilibrium service level of the suppliers if it prefers some supplier excessively, which have the same impact on the equilibrium average service level acquired by the purchaser.