• DocumentCode
    2670678
  • Title

    Theoretical and statistic analysis on necessary bidder numbers for combinatorial auctions

  • Author

    Dingwei Wang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Eng., Northeastern Univ., Shenyang, China
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    23-25 May 2012
  • Firstpage
    2047
  • Lastpage
    2052
  • Abstract
    The reverse combinatorial auctions are widely applied to the centralized procurements and project tenders of governments and enterprise groups. To guarantee the competition of reverse auctions an enough number of bidders is necessary. Based on the computation method of winner combination numbers in literatures, we deduce the formulas to calculate the average feasible solution numbers in single time of bidding. Two theorems on the feasible solution numbers were proposed and proved. They show us the feasible solution numbers increase with the bidder number raise up, and decrease with object number grows up. The same problems of cases with bidding quota are discussed also. By means of proposed computing approach, the average feasible solution numbers of problems with different sizes are obtained. The results present the necessary bidder numbers to guarantee competition. To verify the correctness of proposed formulas, hypothesis testing method is used to a large number of simulated examples. The results support above conclusions. Above research works provide a theoretic foundation for organization and mechanism design of on-line reverse combinatorial auctions in centralized procurements.
  • Keywords
    combinatorial mathematics; electronic commerce; procurement; purchasing; statistical testing; average feasible solution numbers; bidding quota; centralized procurements; computation method; enterprise groups; governments; hypothesis testing method; necessary bidder numbers; online reverse combinatorial auctions; project tenders; statistic analysis; winner combination numbers; Educational institutions; Organizations; Procurement; Simulation; Standards; Testing; Upper bound; Auction mechanism design; Bidder number; Centralized e-Procurement; Combinatorial auction; Hypothesis testing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2012 24th Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Taiyuan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-2073-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2012.6244330
  • Filename
    6244330