Behavioral game model and evolutionary analysis in electricity market

In this paper, we review the behavior of suppliers with different level of rationality. The problem of how to bring electricity market a potential behavior risk is investigated using behavior game theory. First, a behavior automata network model is developed on the condition that the rationality is taken as a variable. Then, a class of learning rules, such as Cournot and extended Cournot adjustment is discussed, which are different behavior variable values. The results of evolutionary experiments indicate that the variables may bring a great diversity of prediction to the market, which means that the market may face a potential risk coming from the rationality of the power suppliers. Therefore, it is important to reduce the diversity by introducing an anti market power. An artificial elasticity method is proposed then for this reason. As an improvement of price cap strategy, the method introduces an artificial elasticity to the oligopolistic competition market and it also induces the suppliers to change their behavior of high bidding. The results of evolutionary experiments show that the method and model are effective