Decentralized charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles: Application of the Nash certainty equivalence principle

Author

Ma, Zhongjing ; Callaway, Duncan ; Hiskens, Ian

Author_Institution

Center for Sustainable Syst. (CSS), Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

fYear

2010

fDate

8-10 Sept. 2010

Firstpage

191

Lastpage

195

Abstract

The paper develops and illustrates a novel decentralized charging control algorithm for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). The proposed algorithm is an application of the so-called Nash certainty equivalence principle (or mean-field games.) The control scheme seeks to achieve social optimality by establishing a PEV charging schedule that fills the overnight demand valley. The paper discusses implementation issues and computational complexity, and illustrates concepts with various numerical examples.

Keywords

decentralised control; electric vehicles; game theory; Nash certainty equivalence principle; PEV charging schedule; computational complexity; decentralized charging control; large populations; mean-field games; plug-in electric vehicles; social optimality; Batteries; Convergence; Distributed control; Electricity; Games; Nash equilibrium; System-on-a-chip; ‘valley-fill’ charging control; Decentralized control; Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle; plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs);

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Control Applications (CCA), 2010 IEEE International Conference on

Conference_Location

Yokohama

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-5362-7

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-5363-4

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CCA.2010.5611184

Filename

5611184