A study of signaling game and its Bayesian equilibrium in CRM

Author

Yin, Q.J. ; Gan, R.C.

Author_Institution

Sch. of Manage. & Econ., Beijing Inst. of Technol.

fYear

2005

fDate

12-18 Oct. 2005

Firstpage

381

Lastpage

386

Abstract

The paper applies the analysis method of the signaling game into the customer relationship management (CRM). Based on the bi-direction information transmitted in the CRM, the signaling game model of business-customer is established, which is represented by six factors, such as advertisement input level, product price, service level, consultation input level, purchase quantity and satisfactory degree. The model focuses on the equilibrium activities of the business and customer in the environment of CRM. The Bayesian equilibrium of the model is obtained by applying backwards induction

Keywords

Bayes methods; customer relationship management; game theory; Bayesian equilibrium; CRM; advertisement input level; business-customer signaling game model; consultation input level; customer relationship management; product price; purchase quantity; service level; Bayesian methods; Bidirectional control; Customer relationship management; Environmental economics; Gallium nitride; Game theory; Management information systems; Paper technology; Signal analysis; Technology management;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

e-Business Engineering, 2005. ICEBE 2005. IEEE International Conference on

Conference_Location

Beijing

Print_ISBN

0-7695-2430-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICEBE.2005.17

Filename

1552921