Title :
ForCES protocol design analysis for protection against DoS attacks
Author :
Lakkavalli, Shashidhar ; Khosravi, Hormuzd
Author_Institution :
Portland State Univ., OR, USA
Abstract :
This work discusses a design analysis for the protection of the ForCES protocol against denial of service (DoS) attacks, which is a key requirement for the ForCES protocol. In order to meet this requirement, the control and data messages in the protocol needs to be separated. The separation scheme consists of: (1) separating the congestion aware, control and data transport connections such as TCP connections and (2) gives higher priority for control. The design issues along with the experimental results are discussed.
Keywords :
local area networks; telecommunication security; transport protocols; DoS attack; ForCES protocol; TCP; denial of service attacks; Computer crime; Data security; Force control; Multicast protocols; Protection; Scalability; Scheduling; TCPIP; Traffic control; Transport protocols;
Conference_Titel :
Computer Communications and Networks, 2004. ICCCN 2004. Proceedings. 13th International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8814-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737
