DocumentCode
2701115
Title
ForCES protocol design analysis for protection against DoS attacks
Author
Lakkavalli, Shashidhar ; Khosravi, Hormuzd
Author_Institution
Portland State Univ., OR, USA
fYear
2004
fDate
11-13 Oct. 2004
Firstpage
550
Abstract
This work discusses a design analysis for the protection of the ForCES protocol against denial of service (DoS) attacks, which is a key requirement for the ForCES protocol. In order to meet this requirement, the control and data messages in the protocol needs to be separated. The separation scheme consists of: (1) separating the congestion aware, control and data transport connections such as TCP connections and (2) gives higher priority for control. The design issues along with the experimental results are discussed.
Keywords
local area networks; telecommunication security; transport protocols; DoS attack; ForCES protocol; TCP; denial of service attacks; Computer crime; Data security; Force control; Multicast protocols; Protection; Scalability; Scheduling; TCPIP; Traffic control; Transport protocols;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Communications and Networks, 2004. ICCCN 2004. Proceedings. 13th International Conference on
ISSN
1095-2055
Print_ISBN
0-7803-8814-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737
Filename
1401737
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