DocumentCode
2719362
Title
Flow-Cookies: Using Bandwidth Amplification to Defend Against DDoS Flooding Attacks
Author
Casado, Martin ; Cao, Pei ; Akella, Aditya ; Provos, Niels
Author_Institution
Stanford Univ.
fYear
23006
fDate
19-21 June 23006
Firstpage
286
Lastpage
287
Abstract
This paper describes flow-cookies which defend against DDoS flooding attacks using bandwidth amplification. "Flow-cookies" is a mechanism in which a Website can reliably send filtering requests to a cooperating node in the network, leveraging its protection bandwidth. In this approach, a third party provider installs a flow-cookies enabled middlebox called the cookie box, in the network at a high bandwidth link. All traffic to or from the protected Web server must traverse the cookie box. The cookie box guarantees that all packets that pass between it and the server belong to a legitimate TCP flow with a valid sender. This implementation is able to operate at gigabit speeds including per-packet IP filtering of millions of addresses. This approach is also very effective against high volume SYN flooding attacks
Keywords
IP networks; Internet; Web sites; security of data; telecommunication security; telecommunication traffic; transport protocols; DDoS flooding attack; SYN flooding attack; Web server; Website; bandwidth amplification; cookie box; distributed denial-of-service; flow-cookies; legitimate TCP flow; network traffic; per-packet IP filtering; transport control protocol; Bandwidth; Floods; Information filtering; Information filters; Middleboxes; Network servers; Protection; TCPIP; Telecommunication traffic; Web server;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Quality of Service, 2006. IWQoS 2006. 14th IEEE International Workshop on
Conference_Location
New Haven, CT
ISSN
1548-615X
Print_ISBN
1-4244-0476-2
Electronic_ISBN
1548-615X
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IWQOS.2006.250484
Filename
4015767
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