DocumentCode
2741781
Title
Investigating the role of a transmission initiator in private peering arrangements
Author
Davoyan, Ruzana ; Altmann, Jörn
Author_Institution
Dept. of Math. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
fYear
2009
fDate
1-5 June 2009
Firstpage
283
Lastpage
286
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of determination of an original initiator of transmission on demand as well as profits of the providers. For that purpose we present a new model, called differentiated traffic-based interconnection agreement (DTIA) that differentiates traffic into two types, referred to as native and stranger in order to determine a transmission initiator. In comparison to the existing financial settlement, under which the payments are based on the net traffic flow, the proposed model governs cost compensation according to the differentiated traffic flows. In addition, a traffic management mechanism that supports the presented approach was described. Analytical studies were provided using Nash bargaining solution to explore how the proposed strategy affects the outcome of providers´ negotiation. The key consequence of the obtained results showed that determination of an initiator of transmission induces providers to receive higher profits.
Keywords
Internet; computer network management; telecommunication traffic; Internet service provider; Nash bargaining; cost compensation; differentiated traffic-based interconnection agreement; financial settlement; net traffic flow; private peering arrangement; traffic management mechanism; transmission initiator; Computer science; Costs; Educational institutions; Engineering management; IP networks; Industrial engineering; Internet; Mathematics; Telecommunication traffic; Traffic control;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Integrated Network Management, 2009. IM '09. IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Long Island, NY
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-3486-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-3487-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/INM.2009.5188822
Filename
5188822
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