DocumentCode
2748455
Title
The empirical research on the performance of stock options incentive
Author
Haxia, Hu ; Jue, Wang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Wuhan Univ. of Technol., Wuhan, China
fYear
2011
fDate
16-17 July 2011
Firstpage
75
Lastpage
78
Abstract
The issue of the separation of ownership from control and the alignment of management and shareholder via the managerial ownership of equity remain the key topic of Chinese listed companies. Through the empirical study, this paper reveals that the managerial shareholding has no effect on management performance. The fundamental resolution to get the stock option incentive work in China is to set up a reasonable ownership structure and an effective capital market.
Keywords
incentive schemes; stock markets; Chinese listed companies; capital market; equity; management performance; management-shareholder alignment; managerial ownership; managerial shareholding; ownership structure; stock options incentives; Companies; Correlation; Indexes; Mathematical model; Security; Stock markets; business performance; incentive of stock option; managerial ownership;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Product Innovation Management (ICPIM), 2011 6th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0359-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICPIM.2011.5983606
Filename
5983606
Link To Document