• DocumentCode
    2754541
  • Title

    Competition and cooperation in the energy strategy game

  • Author

    Wen Xiao ; Zhaoxi Tang ; Gaobang Lin

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ., Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    2-5 June 2010
  • Firstpage
    641
  • Lastpage
    645
  • Abstract
    As the international prices of energy resources keep rising, some countries are trying to adjust their overseas energy strategies in order to gain more benefits. This paper, viewing from China´s standpoint, analyzes the case of dynamic game with incomplete information under the Harsanyi transformation based on KMRW reputation model. Taking the China-Japan, China-India energy game cases for instance, we find that the cooperative action could be the best strategy for both China and India according to our model, while the overseas energy strategy which is taken by Japan nowadays will do harm to its economic recovery and prosperity in the long run. According to the payoff expression, the adjustment of each country´s energy strategy inclines to be diversified in the energy constitution. The GDP and the economic growth rate can help abate the petroleum-dependency by developing the capability of R&D and deepening the exploration of new substitute energy.
  • Keywords
    economic indicators; energy resources; game theory; China-India energy game; China-Japan energy game; Gross Domestic Product; Harsanyi transformation; KMRW reputation model; cooperative action; dynamic game; economic growth rate; energy strategy game; overseas energy strategy; Constitution; Economic indicators; Educational institutions; Energy resources; Fuel economy; Game theory; Information analysis; National security; Petroleum; Power generation economics; competition; cooperation; energy; incomplete information dynamic game;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management of Innovation and Technology (ICMIT), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Singapore
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6565-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6566-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMIT.2010.5492743
  • Filename
    5492743