• DocumentCode
    2774018
  • Title

    IRONMAN: Using Social Networks to Add Incentives and Reputation to Opportunistic Networks

  • Author

    Bigwood, Greg ; Henderson, Tristan

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    9-11 Oct. 2011
  • Firstpage
    65
  • Lastpage
    72
  • Abstract
    Opportunistic networks enable users to communicate in the absence of network infrastructure. But forwarding messages in such a network incurs costs for nodes in terms of energy and storage. This may lead to nodes being selfish and not forwarding messages for other nodes, resulting in degraded network performance. This paper presents a novel incentive mechanism for opportunistic networks that uses pre-existing social-network information to detect and punish selfish nodes, incentivising them to participate in the network. Trace-driven simulations demonstrate that our mechanism performs better than existing mechanisms, and that social-network information can also be used to improve existing incentive mechanisms.
  • Keywords
    digital simulation; social networking (online); IRONMAN; incentives and reputation for opportunistic networks using social networks; network infrastructure; selfish nodes; trace-driven simulations; Accuracy; History; Peer to peer computing; Quality of service; Routing; Routing protocols; Social network services;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE Third Inernational Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Boston, MA
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-1931-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PASSAT/SocialCom.2011.60
  • Filename
    6113096