DocumentCode
2774018
Title
IRONMAN: Using Social Networks to Add Incentives and Reputation to Opportunistic Networks
Author
Bigwood, Greg ; Henderson, Tristan
Author_Institution
Sch. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
fYear
2011
fDate
9-11 Oct. 2011
Firstpage
65
Lastpage
72
Abstract
Opportunistic networks enable users to communicate in the absence of network infrastructure. But forwarding messages in such a network incurs costs for nodes in terms of energy and storage. This may lead to nodes being selfish and not forwarding messages for other nodes, resulting in degraded network performance. This paper presents a novel incentive mechanism for opportunistic networks that uses pre-existing social-network information to detect and punish selfish nodes, incentivising them to participate in the network. Trace-driven simulations demonstrate that our mechanism performs better than existing mechanisms, and that social-network information can also be used to improve existing incentive mechanisms.
Keywords
digital simulation; social networking (online); IRONMAN; incentives and reputation for opportunistic networks using social networks; network infrastructure; selfish nodes; trace-driven simulations; Accuracy; History; Peer to peer computing; Quality of service; Routing; Routing protocols; Social network services;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE Third Inernational Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on
Conference_Location
Boston, MA
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-1931-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PASSAT/SocialCom.2011.60
Filename
6113096
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