DocumentCode :
2784502
Title :
Attribution of Fraudulent Resource Consumption in the Cloud
Author :
Idziorek, Joseph ; Tannian, Mark ; Jacobson, Doug
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA, USA
fYear :
2012
fDate :
24-29 June 2012
Firstpage :
99
Lastpage :
106
Abstract :
Obligated by a utility pricing model, Internet-facing web resources hosted in the public cloud are vulnerable to Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attacks. Unlike an application-layer DDoS attack that consumes resources with the goal of disrupting short-term availability, an FRC attack is a considerably more subtle attack that instead seeks to disrupt the long-term financial viability of operating in the cloud by exploiting the utility pricing model over an extended time period. By fraudulently consuming web resources in sufficient volume (i.e. data transferred out of the cloud), an attacker (e.g. botnet) is able to incur significant fraudulent charges to the victim. This paper proposes an attribution methodology to identify malicious clients participating in an FRC attack. Experimental results demonstrate that the presented methodology achieves qualified success against challenging attack scenarios.
Keywords :
cloud computing; fraud; pricing; security of data; FRC attack; Internet-facing Web resources; application-layer DDoS attack; fraudulent resource consumption attacks; fraudulent resource consumption attribution; long-term financial viability; malicious clients identification; public cloud; utility pricing model; Bandwidth; Cloud computing; Computer crime; Context; NASA; Pricing; Training; anomaly detection; application-layer DDoS; attribution; cloud computing; fraudulent resource consumption attack; security; utility pricing model;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2012 IEEE 5th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Honolulu, HI
ISSN :
2159-6182
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-2892-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CLOUD.2012.23
Filename :
6253494
Link To Document :
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