DocumentCode
2793241
Title
Background of Independent Directors and Risk Aversion
Author
Tan, Jinsong ; Zhou, Fan
fYear
2009
fDate
21-23 Nov. 2009
Firstpage
367
Lastpage
371
Abstract
This study empirically tests the prediction that independent directors with different backgrounds have different risk awareness on listed companies, by using the dataset of resignation of independent directors of China’s listed companies during the years of 2002 and 2005 as targeted samples. We find that independent directors with accounting background are more sensitive to earning management, while independent directors with intermediary agency background are more sensitive to event risk, and independent directors with entity or academic research background are more sensitive to tunneling risk. Our study also finds that the reputation of independent directors has no significant impact on risk aversion, but independent directors with higher education background have stronger risk awareness.
Keywords
Board of Directors; Companies; Costs; Information resources; Law; Legal factors; Risk management; Stock markets; Sun; Tunneling; background of independent director; independent director; risk aversion;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Cooperation and Promotion of Information Resources in Science and Technology, 2009. COINFO '09. Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location
Beijing, China
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3898-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/COINFO.2009.43
Filename
5361919
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