• DocumentCode
    2793241
  • Title

    Background of Independent Directors and Risk Aversion

  • Author

    Tan, Jinsong ; Zhou, Fan

  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    21-23 Nov. 2009
  • Firstpage
    367
  • Lastpage
    371
  • Abstract
    This study empirically tests the prediction that independent directors with different backgrounds have different risk awareness on listed companies, by using the dataset of resignation of independent directors of China’s listed companies during the years of 2002 and 2005 as targeted samples. We find that independent directors with accounting background are more sensitive to earning management, while independent directors with intermediary agency background are more sensitive to event risk, and independent directors with entity or academic research background are more sensitive to tunneling risk. Our study also finds that the reputation of independent directors has no significant impact on risk aversion, but independent directors with higher education background have stronger risk awareness.
  • Keywords
    Board of Directors; Companies; Costs; Information resources; Law; Legal factors; Risk management; Stock markets; Sun; Tunneling; background of independent director; independent director; risk aversion;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Cooperation and Promotion of Information Resources in Science and Technology, 2009. COINFO '09. Fourth International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing, China
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3898-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/COINFO.2009.43
  • Filename
    5361919