A Strategy-proof Pricing Scheme for Multiple Resource Type Allocations

Resource sharing on the Internet is becoming increasingly pervasive. Recently, there is growing interest in distributed systems such as peer-to-peer and grid, with efforts being directed towards resource allocation strategies that incentivize users to share resources. While combinatorial auctions can perform multiple resource type allocations, it is computationally a NP-complete problem. Thus, allocation in large distributed resource sharing systems focuses mainly on a single resource type. We propose a strategy-proof, VCG-based resource pricing scheme for resource allocation in dynamic markets where users behave rationally in meeting their own interest. Our mechanism is designed to meet the needs of large distributed systems, delivering the following key properties: multiple resource type allocations, individual rationality, incentive compatibility for both buyers and sellers, budget balance and computational efficiency. Simulation evaluation of our prototype based on a centralized implementation demonstrates the viability of our approach, as compared to both traditional and combinatorial auctions.