Title :
Attitude Adaptation in Satisficing Games
Author :
Nokleby, Matthew S. ; Stirling, Wynn C.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT
Abstract :
Satisficing game theory is an alternative to traditional game theory which offers more flexibility in modeling players in social interactions. Unfortunately, satisficing players with conflicting attitudes may implement dysfunctional behaviors, resulting in poor performance. We present a method based on evolutionary game theory by which players may adapt their attitudes to their circumstances, allowing them to overcome dysfunction. Additionally, we extend the Nash equilibrium concept to satisficing games, showing that the method presented leads the players toward equilibrium in their attitudes. These ideas are applied to the ultimatum game as a simple example
Keywords :
behavioural sciences; evolutionary computation; game theory; social sciences; Nash equilibrium; attitude adaptation; evolutionary game theory; satisficing game theory; social interactions; Bridges; Computational intelligence; Cost function; Decision making; Decision theory; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Pressure measurement; USA Councils;
Conference_Titel :
Foundations of Computational Intelligence, 2007. FOCI 2007. IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Honolulu, HI
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0703-6
DOI :
10.1109/FOCI.2007.372188