• DocumentCode
    2837020
  • Title

    Quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under asymmetric information based on game theory

  • Author

    Bai, Shizhen ; Zhang, Lin

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    26-28 May 2010
  • Firstpage
    1345
  • Lastpage
    1350
  • Abstract
    Research on quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under asymmetric information can not only enlarge the theory of logistics service supply chain but also provide guidance for business practice. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium model under asymmetric information is established based on a basic model of quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under symmetric information and an equilibrium result is obtained, then the influence on quality supervision is considered after a factor of competition between logistics service suppliers is introduced and a new result of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is got. Simulation results show that the quality completion level of supplier rises up and the quality supervision level of integrator brings down after the factor is introduced. Therefore, in practice, the level of logistics service can be improved effectively and the overall quality of logistics services supply chain can be enhanced through strengthening the competition between logistics service suppliers.
  • Keywords
    Bayes methods; game theory; logistics; quality management; supply chain management; Bayesian Nash equilibrium model; asymmetric information; business practice; game theory; logistics service supply chain; quality supervision; Bayesian methods; Contracts; Costs; Game theory; Logistics; Manufacturing; Nash equilibrium; Quality management; Subcontracting; Supply chains; Asymmetric Information; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Logistics Service Supply Chain; Quality Supervision;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2010 Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Xuzhou
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5181-4
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5182-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2010.5498186
  • Filename
    5498186