• DocumentCode
    2841650
  • Title

    DoX: A Peer-to-Peer Antidote for DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks

  • Author

    Yuan, Lihua ; Kant, Krishna ; Mohapatra, Prasant ; Chuah, Chen-Nee

  • Author_Institution
    ECE, UC Davis. lyuan@ece.ucdavis.edu
  • Volume
    5
  • fYear
    2006
  • fDate
    38869
  • Firstpage
    2345
  • Lastpage
    2350
  • Abstract
    The mapping service provided by the Domain Name System (DNS) is fundamental not only to the health of the Internet but also to the protection and integrity of the data. Recently, the DNS infrastructure has suffered several malicious attacks including DNS cache poisoning, which causes the DNS to return false name-to-IP mappings and can be used as a foothold for more insidious attacks. This paper proposes DoX, a peer-to-peer based scheme, to detect and correct inaccurate DNS records caused by cache poisoning attacks. DoX also helps DNS servers to improve cache consistency by detecting and removing obsolete records. DoX does not require modifications to the current infrastructure and can be deployed quickly. It does not use cryptographic techniques and thus does not suffer from the key management and processing overhead issues of those techniques.
  • Keywords
    Computer crime; Data security; Distributed databases; Domain Name System; Electronic mail; Peer to peer computing; Protection; Public key cryptography; Web and internet services; Web server;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Communications, 2006. ICC '06. IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Istanbul
  • ISSN
    8164-9547
  • Print_ISBN
    1-4244-0355-3
  • Electronic_ISBN
    8164-9547
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICC.2006.255120
  • Filename
    4024515