Title :
Games, deception, and Jones´ Lemma
Author :
Fuchs, Z.E. ; Khargonekar, P.P.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
fDate :
June 29 2011-July 1 2011
Abstract :
Deception is pervasive in adversarial situations. Here we present a formulation of deception using a two-player game setting. One of the two players deploys a sensor network to gather information on the opponent who in turn can employ deception tactics. We solve the resulting general game using linear programs. We pose an illustrative example and develop closed form solutions for special cases. Finally, we show how our solutions capture the well-known "Jones\´ Lemma" from the deception literature.
Keywords :
game theory; linear programming; Jones lemma; deception tactics; general game; linear program; sensor network; two-player game setting; Closed-form solution; Communities; Drugs; Game theory; Games; Law enforcement; Linear programming;
Conference_Titel :
American Control Conference (ACC), 2011
Conference_Location :
San Francisco, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0080-4
DOI :
10.1109/ACC.2011.5991297