Micro-Payment Platform Based on Incentive Compatible Mechanism in P2P Systems

Author

Wang Qingjie ; Liu Yusheng ; Yu Jian ; Zhang Jie ; Zhao Zheng

Author_Institution

Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Technol., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China

fYear

2009

fDate

11-13 Dec. 2009

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

4

Abstract

At present free-riding is prevalent in P2P network. Free-riding behaviors not only make the scale of network services decline theoretically from O(n²) down to O(n) but also seriously limit the advantage of P2P. In order to solve the problem, in this paper the micro-payment platform based on incentive compatible mechanism is presented. In this platform the equal services between nodes can be achieved and the differences of node capacities are also considered. Experiments show that the model can effectively solve the problem of free-riding.

Keywords

game theory; peer-to-peer computing; quality of service; P2P network; P2P system; free-riding; game theory; incentive compatible mechanism; micropayment platform; network service; node capacity; node service; Application software; Computer interfaces; Computer science; Cost accounting; Game theory; Hardware; Peer to peer computing; Pricing; Production facilities; Quality of service;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering, 2009. CiSE 2009. International Conference on

Conference_Location

Wuhan

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-4507-3

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-4507-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CISE.2009.5365976

Filename

5365976