Job Allocation in a Temporary Employment Agency via Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auctions Using a Multi-agent System

Author

Landes, Jürgen ; Buettner, Ricardo

Author_Institution

FOM Hochschule fur Oekonomie & Manage., Munich, Germany

fYear

2011

fDate

Nov. 26 2011-Dec. 4 2011

Firstpage

182

Lastpage

187

Abstract

We consider the problem of how a temporary employment agency allocates temporary agency workers to jobs. To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space. That is agents can specify how much a work contract consisting of several components such as wage per hour, days of leave, overtime premiums and hours of work is valued. We show that the mechanism we develop satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.

Keywords

contracts; employment; multi-agent systems; personnel; resource allocation; Pareto efficiency; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction; incentive compatibility; job allocation; multi-agent system; multidimensional contract space; multidimensional price VCG auction; temporary agency worker; temporary employment agency; Contracts; Cost accounting; Employment; Level set; Protocols; Resource management; Electronic Human Resource Management; Mechanism Design; Multi Agent System; Multi-dimensional Price; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Artificial Intelligence (MICAI), 2011 10th Mexican International Conference on

Conference_Location

Puebla

Print_ISBN

978-1-4577-2173-1

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/MICAI.2011.11

Filename

6118993