DocumentCode
2873975
Title
Should Online Auctions Employ Dynamic Buyout Pricing Models?
Author
Vragov, Roumen ; Shang, Di ; Lang, Karl R.
Author_Institution
City Univ. of New York (CUNY), New York
fYear
2008
fDate
7-10 Jan. 2008
Firstpage
381
Lastpage
381
Abstract
Online auctions are inherently dynamic. Online auction designs that internalize temporal changes in the economic environment are generally expected to perform better than static designs. This is because providing opportunities for both buyers and sellers to inform each other about preference changes over time can increase market transparency and lead to more efficient markets. In this paper, we focus on a feature that is unique to online auctions, the buyout price. We introduce a dynamic buyout model and show analytically how the buyout price should change over time in order to maximize seller profit and buyer surplus. Based on our theoretical results, we suggest that online auction performance can be improved with the addition of more dynamic features. Finally, we describe an experimental design that can be used to estimate the benefits of a dynamic buyout option.
Keywords
commerce; pricing; buyout price; dynamic buyout model; dynamic buyout pricing model; economic environment; online auctions; static designs; Consumer electronics; Costs; Design for experiments; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Government; Instruments; Pricing; Process design; Protection;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Proceedings of the 41st Annual
Conference_Location
Waikoloa, HI
ISSN
1530-1605
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/HICSS.2008.392
Filename
4439086
Link To Document