• DocumentCode
    2873975
  • Title

    Should Online Auctions Employ Dynamic Buyout Pricing Models?

  • Author

    Vragov, Roumen ; Shang, Di ; Lang, Karl R.

  • Author_Institution
    City Univ. of New York (CUNY), New York
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    7-10 Jan. 2008
  • Firstpage
    381
  • Lastpage
    381
  • Abstract
    Online auctions are inherently dynamic. Online auction designs that internalize temporal changes in the economic environment are generally expected to perform better than static designs. This is because providing opportunities for both buyers and sellers to inform each other about preference changes over time can increase market transparency and lead to more efficient markets. In this paper, we focus on a feature that is unique to online auctions, the buyout price. We introduce a dynamic buyout model and show analytically how the buyout price should change over time in order to maximize seller profit and buyer surplus. Based on our theoretical results, we suggest that online auction performance can be improved with the addition of more dynamic features. Finally, we describe an experimental design that can be used to estimate the benefits of a dynamic buyout option.
  • Keywords
    commerce; pricing; buyout price; dynamic buyout model; dynamic buyout pricing model; economic environment; online auctions; static designs; Consumer electronics; Costs; Design for experiments; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Government; Instruments; Pricing; Process design; Protection;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Proceedings of the 41st Annual
  • Conference_Location
    Waikoloa, HI
  • ISSN
    1530-1605
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/HICSS.2008.392
  • Filename
    4439086