DocumentCode
2904411
Title
A Game Analysis of the Supervision Model for Preventing Tunneling Behavior in China´s Family Firms
Author
Shen Minghao ; Tang Jing
Author_Institution
Center for Cantonese Merchants Res., Guangdong Univ. of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China
fYear
2011
fDate
17-18 Oct. 2011
Firstpage
345
Lastpage
348
Abstract
Recently, it has become a hot issue to prevent the controlling family from tunneling listed companies. This paper aims to apply the analytical framework of the collusion theory to conduct the research onto the tunneling behavior in family firms. With the use of game theory, a supervision model for preventing tunneling behavior is established and some countermeasures are proposed.
Keywords
behavioural sciences; game theory; small-to-medium enterprises; China family firm; collusion theory; game analysis; game theory; listed companies; supervision model; tunneling behavior prediction; Companies; Economics; Games; Inspection; Security; Tunneling; Family Firms; Game Analysis; Supervision Model;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE), 2011 Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-1541-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/BIFE.2011.5
Filename
6121154
Link To Document