Title :
Entry and Exit Decisions in a Symmetric Duopoly Option Game Model
Author :
Gong, Li ; Tian, Jin
Author_Institution :
Inst. of China Innovation, East China Normal Univ., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
How many subsidies can cause firms to enter and exit is an interesting question. Different from the existing literature, the option game theory is applied to construct a symmetric duopoly model of investment with entry and exit decisions under uncertainty in this paper. As a result, the relation between entry and exit optimal thresholds and subsidies is shown. Moreover, the equilibrium strategies corresponding subsidies are given.
Keywords :
decision theory; game theory; investment; entry decision; equilibrium strategy; exit decision; investment; symmetric duopoly model; symmetric duopoly option game model; Equations; Game theory; Games; Government; Investments; Microwave antennas; Uncertainty; entry and exit; investment strategy; option game; subsidy;
Conference_Titel :
Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE), 2011 Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-1541-9
DOI :
10.1109/BIFE.2011.56
