DocumentCode
2905549
Title
Entry and Exit Decisions in a Symmetric Duopoly Option Game Model
Author
Gong, Li ; Tian, Jin
Author_Institution
Inst. of China Innovation, East China Normal Univ., Shanghai, China
fYear
2011
fDate
17-18 Oct. 2011
Firstpage
591
Lastpage
593
Abstract
How many subsidies can cause firms to enter and exit is an interesting question. Different from the existing literature, the option game theory is applied to construct a symmetric duopoly model of investment with entry and exit decisions under uncertainty in this paper. As a result, the relation between entry and exit optimal thresholds and subsidies is shown. Moreover, the equilibrium strategies corresponding subsidies are given.
Keywords
decision theory; game theory; investment; entry decision; equilibrium strategy; exit decision; investment; symmetric duopoly model; symmetric duopoly option game model; Equations; Game theory; Games; Government; Investments; Microwave antennas; Uncertainty; entry and exit; investment strategy; option game; subsidy;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE), 2011 Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-1541-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/BIFE.2011.56
Filename
6121210
Link To Document