• DocumentCode
    2914779
  • Title

    Study on the third-party logistics by symmetric evolutionary game under strong correlation between individual pay-off and evolution stage

  • Author

    Pang, Xiaoyan ; Tan, Qingmei ; Aiqing, Ruan ; Chunxun, Xie

  • Author_Institution
    Nanjing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Nanjing
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    18-20 Nov. 2007
  • Firstpage
    1250
  • Lastpage
    1255
  • Abstract
    One category chain model of evolutionary game is proposed to study the process of some economic conditions. It could be used to describe some real life conditions that the income of some one is in strong correlation with the stage at that time he makes decision, and also condition that decision maker is with bounded rationality and limited knowledge. This paper discusses its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and some important conclusions are found, that in some situation ESS could be gotten directly, but in another condition ESS could not be worked out and it will be sensitive to initial condition. On the basis of these, this model is used to explain an alliance of Third-Party Logistics(TPL, or 3PL), and a valuable conclusion is gotten and in some situation an alliance of Third-Party Logistics could be created by some ways.
  • Keywords
    correlation methods; decision making; economics; evolutionary computation; game theory; logistics; chain model; decision making; economic condition; evolutionary stable strategy; individual pay-off; symmetric evolutionary game theory; third-party logistics; Air transportation; Companies; Cultural differences; Electronic switching systems; Game theory; Intelligent systems; Logistics;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Grey Systems and Intelligent Services, 2007. GSIS 2007. IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Nanjing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1294-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1294-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GSIS.2007.4443473
  • Filename
    4443473