• DocumentCode
    2931555
  • Title

    The optimal cost-sharing incentive model of main manufacturer-suppliers for complex equipment under grey information

  • Author

    Chen Hongzhuan ; Fang Zhigeng ; Liu Sifeng ; Ma Shuai

  • Author_Institution
    Sci. Dev. Res. Center, Nanjing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Nanjing, China
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    15-17 Nov. 2013
  • Firstpage
    489
  • Lastpage
    494
  • Abstract
    Based on the uncertainty and grey level of suppliers´ efforts, the paper put forward the incentive strategy of main manufacturer sharing the suppliers´ efforts cost, and established the optimal cost-sharing model under grey effort level. The paper calculated Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium under the above incentive model, and came to the optimal proportion, the optimal effort level and the optimal income of main manufacturer sharing the supplier´ development cost. It analyzed that the cooperation status between the main manufacturer and suppliers shifts from Nash equilibrium to Stackelberg equilibrium, and effective cost-sharing incentive program can achieve profits to growth and the effort level of the main manufacturer and suppliers to improve, proving that cooperation between the main manufacturer and suppliers achieves the possibility of Pareto improvement.
  • Keywords
    Pareto optimisation; game theory; grey systems; incentive schemes; profitability; supply chain management; Nash equilibrium; Pareto improvement; Stackelberg equilibrium; complex equipment; cost-sharing incentive program; grey information; incentive strategy; manufacturer sharing; manufacturer suppliers; optimal cost-sharing incentive model; optimal proportion; supplier development cost; supplier efforts; Aircraft; Collaboration; Educational institutions; Games; Nash equilibrium; Supply chains; incentive; main manufacturer-supplier; the cost-sharing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Grey Systems and Intelligent Services, 2013 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Macao
  • ISSN
    2166-9430
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-5247-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GSIS.2013.6714833
  • Filename
    6714833