• DocumentCode
    2944725
  • Title

    Noninterference through Secure Multi-execution

  • Author

    Devriese, Dominique ; Piessens, Frank

  • Author_Institution
    DistriNet Res. Group, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    16-19 May 2010
  • Firstpage
    109
  • Lastpage
    124
  • Abstract
    A program is defined to be noninterferent if its outputs cannot be influenced by inputs at a higher security level than their own. Various researchers have demonstrated how this property (or closely related properties) can be achieved through information flow analysis, using either a static analysis (with a type system or otherwise), or using a dynamic monitoring system. We propose an alternative approach, based on a technique we call secure multi-execution. The main idea is to execute a program multiple times, once for each security level, using special rules for I/O operations. Outputs are only produced in the execution linked to their security level. Inputs are replaced by default inputs except in executions linked to their security level or higher. Input side effects are supported by making higher-security-level executions reuse inputs obtained in lower-security-level threads. We show that this approach is interesting from both a theoretical and practical viewpoint. Theoretically, we prove for a simple deterministic language with I/O operations, that this approach guarantees complete soundness (even for the timing and termination covert channels), as well as good precision (identical I/O for terminating runs of termination-sensitively noninterferent programs). On the practical side, we present an experiment implementing secure multi-execution in the mainstream Spidermonkey Javascript engine, exploiting parallelism on a current multi-core computer. Benchmark results of execution time and memory for the Google Chrome v8 Benchmark suite show that the approach is practical for a mainstream browser setting. Certain programs are even executed faster under secure multi-execution than under the standard execution. We discuss challenges and propose possible solutions for implementing the technique in a real browser, in particular handling the DOM tree and browser callback functions. Finally, we discuss how secure multi-execution can be extended to handle language feature- - s like exceptions, concurrency or nondeterminism.
  • Keywords
    data analysis; security of data; DOM tree; Google Chrome v8 Benchmark suite; Spidermonkey Javascript engine; browser callback functions; concurrency feature; dynamic monitoring system; exception feature; information flow analysis; lower-security-level threads; nondeterminism feature; noninterferent program; secure multiexecution technique; static analysis; Assembly; Computational modeling; Computer architecture; Digital signal processing; Digital signal processing chips; Educational institutions; Large scale integration; Logic; Registers; Telecommunication control; Information Flow; Noninterference; Secure Multi-Execution;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Berkeley/Oakland, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6894-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1081-6011
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SP.2010.15
  • Filename
    5504711