DocumentCode
2944766
Title
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
Author
McCune, Jonathan M. ; Li, Yanlin ; Qu, Ning ; Zhou, Zongwei ; Datta, Anupam ; Gligor, Virgil ; Perrig, Adrian
Author_Institution
CyLab, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA, USA
fYear
2010
fDate
16-19 May 2010
Firstpage
143
Lastpage
158
Abstract
An important security challenge is to protect the execution of security-sensitive code on legacy systems from malware that may infect the OS, applications, or system devices. Prior work experienced a tradeoff between the level of security achieved and efficiency. In this work, we leverage the features of modern processors from AMD and Intel to overcome the tradeoff to simultaneously achieve a high level of security and high performance. We present TrustVisor, a special-purpose hypervisor that provides code integrity as well as data integrity and secrecy for selected portions of an application. TrustVisor achieves a high level of security, first because it can protect sensitive code at a very fine granularity, and second because it has a very small code base (only around 6K lines of code) that makes verification feasible. TrustVisor can also attest the existence of isolated execution to an external entity. We have implemented TrustVisor to protect security-sensitive code blocks while imposing less than 7% overhead on the legacy OS and its applications in the common case.
Keywords
Algorithm design and analysis; Arm; Circuit testing; Computer security; Costs; Hardware; Logic; Privacy; Process design; Runtime; Attestation; Integrity Measurement; Minimal TCB; TPM; Trusted Computing; Virtualization;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location
Oakland, CA, USA
ISSN
1081-6011
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6894-2
Electronic_ISBN
1081-6011
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SP.2010.17
Filename
5504713
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