Title :
Agency Costs of Engineering Project Procurement
Author :
Shouke Chen ; Zhuobin Wei
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Logistics Eng., Naval Univ. of Eng., Tianjin, China
Abstract :
Based on asymmetric information game and principal-agent theory, by analyzing the forming reasons and connotation relationships of agency costs which occurs during the process of engineering project procurement, this paper give out the model of optimal contract and monitoring mechanism. It also analyzes the relationships between the monitoring mechanism and incentive mechanism.
Keywords :
contracts; game theory; procurement; project management; agency costs; asymmetric information game; engineering project procurement process; incentive mechanism; monitoring mechanism; optimal contract model; principal-agent theory; Contracts; Games; Hydroelectric power generation; Investments; Loss measurement; Monitoring; Procurement;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6579-8
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998229
