DocumentCode
2964645
Title
The option-game analyses on pricing decision of the target enterprise of M&A under fuzzy information surroundings
Author
Yu, Jing ; Xu, Bin ; Wang, Yuanhua
Author_Institution
Res. Center on Fictitious Econ. & Data Sci., CAS, Beijing, China
fYear
2009
fDate
8-11 Dec. 2009
Firstpage
754
Lastpage
758
Abstract
Though the price of M&A has already been studied based on classical NPV model, which is not adaptable for real uncertain situation. This paper presents a new approach of measuring the target enterprise value of M&A, consisting of two parts, one is measured by NPV model and another is measured by real options model, which can be integrated to calculate the target enterprise by introducing synergy effect coefficient into the developed model. The price of target enterprise can be attained by famous Rubenstein bargaining theorem which was improved to adapted to the fuzzy information surroundings. In last, a numeric simulation was drawn to illustrate the application of price decision formulation, and the sensitivity of price was also shown with the variability of parameters among the developed price-decision model.
Keywords
corporate acquisitions; fuzzy set theory; game theory; pricing; NPV model; Rubenstein bargaining theorem; fuzzy information surroundings; merger and acquisition; option-game analyses; price decision formulation; pricing decision; real options model; synergy effect coefficient; target enterprise; Clothing; Content addressable storage; Corporate acquisitions; Finance; Fluctuations; Game theory; Information analysis; Measurement units; Numerical simulation; Pricing; fuzzy information surroundings; improved Rubenstein bargaining theorem; option game analyses; synergy effect coefficient;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IEEM 2009. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Hong Kong
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4869-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4870-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IEEM.2009.5372927
Filename
5372927
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