Research frame for incentive mechanism of the construction Agent in government investment project: from the perspective of project governance

With project management model reformation in government investment project (GIP), the implementation of the agent construction system (ACS) improved project management performance of GIP in China. It is a crucial issue that incentive mechanism study for the Agent influences further reformation and implementation of the ACS, but the researches above are scattered, and most of them are based on principal-agent theory, which caused the paradox of incentive mechanism for the Agent. The paradox would be solved better by introducing project governance (PG) theory. This paper integrates various incentive mechanisms on institutional level into the theory frame of PG, and forwards an overall theory frame of incentive mechanism for the Agent. The frame contains internal and external incentive mechanisms: the former includes the risk allocation (RA) mechanism and the rewards mechanism based on RA; the latter includes project management performance evaluation mechanism and reputation mechanism.