DocumentCode
2968113
Title
Bidding Strategy in Takeover
Author
Ping Jiang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Int. Trade & Econ., Univ. of Int. Bus. & Econ., Beijing, China
fYear
2011
fDate
12-14 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
The paper models the toehold acquisition and bid price decision problem faced by bidders in takeovers. The model builds upon the model of takeover proposed by Grossman and Hart (1980) and its later extensions by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994). By allowing the firm value to decrease after a failed tender offer, I find that the bidder with greater improvement of target firm value will overbid while low value enhancing bidder will not. In this sense, I provide an explanation for the overbidding behavior in takeover of only one bidder.
Keywords
commerce; corporate acquisitions; bid price decision problem; bidding strategy; takeover; toehold acquisition; Biological system modeling; Business; Economics; Finance; Games; Resistance; Resists;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6579-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998440
Filename
5998440
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