DocumentCode
2984976
Title
Specific Human Capital and Optimal Design of Pension Plans
Author
Lu Feng ; Yang, Yansui ; Shi Bingqing
Author_Institution
Sch. of Public Policy & Manage., Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China
fYear
2011
fDate
12-14 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
The optimal design of a corporate pension plan should be able to balance employee incentives and the profits of the enterprise. Given the existence of specific human capital, an employee has a certain "bargaining power" in the enterprise, and this bargaining power must be taken into account in the pension plan design. We set the model based on such considerations, and we first studied the attractiveness of a specific pension plan with respect to the type and the degrees of effort of employees. The following comparative static analysis showed how the changes in a pension plan\´s factors influenced the employees\´ participation and degree of effort. Finally, we studied the optimal design of a pension plan, which maximizes the profits of the enterprise under different combinations of factors.
Keywords
incentive schemes; pensions; profitability; statistical analysis; strategic planning; bargaining power; comparative static analysis; corporate pension plan; employee incentives; employee participation; enterprise profits; optimal design; specific human capital; Economics; Humans; Investments; Mathematical model; Pensions; Presses;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6579-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5999306
Filename
5999306
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