• DocumentCode
    2984976
  • Title

    Specific Human Capital and Optimal Design of Pension Plans

  • Author

    Lu Feng ; Yang, Yansui ; Shi Bingqing

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Public Policy & Manage., Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    12-14 Aug. 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    The optimal design of a corporate pension plan should be able to balance employee incentives and the profits of the enterprise. Given the existence of specific human capital, an employee has a certain "bargaining power" in the enterprise, and this bargaining power must be taken into account in the pension plan design. We set the model based on such considerations, and we first studied the attractiveness of a specific pension plan with respect to the type and the degrees of effort of employees. The following comparative static analysis showed how the changes in a pension plan\´s factors influenced the employees\´ participation and degree of effort. Finally, we studied the optimal design of a pension plan, which maximizes the profits of the enterprise under different combinations of factors.
  • Keywords
    incentive schemes; pensions; profitability; statistical analysis; strategic planning; bargaining power; comparative static analysis; corporate pension plan; employee incentives; employee participation; enterprise profits; optimal design; specific human capital; Economics; Humans; Investments; Mathematical model; Pensions; Presses;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6579-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5999306
  • Filename
    5999306