Security Analysis of Some Recent Authentication Protocols for RFID

Radio frequency identification technology has been increasingly used in many applications. However, there are many threats and security risks in the RFID systems since an insecure wireless channel exists between the reader and the tags. The security of RFID protocols must be designed and proved with careful cryptanalysis. In this paper, we analyze some RFID authentication protocols proposed recently. Firstly, Shen et al. propose an authentication protocol with strong privacy and security, but we prove that the attacker is able to impersonate a reader to desynchronize a tag by eavesdropping on and modifying the messages transmitted. Secondly, WeiHWang et al. claim that their hash function based protocol can resist from several attacks including denial of service attack, but we perform this attack by inducing a desynchronization of secret between server and tags. At last, Sandhya and Rangaswarmy propose an authentication protocol with many security features, while we present desynchronization attack and reader impersonation attack on this protocol.