• DocumentCode
    2988820
  • Title

    Saddle-point solution of the fingerprinting capacity game under the marking assumption

  • Author

    Huang, Yen-Wei ; Moulin, Pierre

  • Author_Institution
    ECE Dept., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    June 28 2009-July 3 2009
  • Firstpage
    2256
  • Lastpage
    2260
  • Abstract
    We study a fingerprinting game in which the collusion channel is unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders. Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maxmin games with mutual information as the payoff function. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution. If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprint alphabet is binary, we derive equations that can numerically solve the capacity game for arbitrary k. We also provide tight upper and lower bounds on the capacity. Finally, we discuss the asymptotic behavior of the fingerprinting game for large k and practical implementation issues.
  • Keywords
    copy protection; copyright; game theory; security of data; collusion channel; fingerprinting capacity game; marking assumption; maximal coalition size; maxmin games sequence; saddle-point solution; saddle-point solutions; two-person zero-sum game; Computational complexity; Copyright protection; Decoding; Equations; Fingerprint recognition; Forgery; Law; Legal factors; Mutual information;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Information Theory, 2009. ISIT 2009. IEEE International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Seoul
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4312-3
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4313-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISIT.2009.5205882
  • Filename
    5205882