DocumentCode
2988820
Title
Saddle-point solution of the fingerprinting capacity game under the marking assumption
Author
Huang, Yen-Wei ; Moulin, Pierre
Author_Institution
ECE Dept., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
fYear
2009
fDate
June 28 2009-July 3 2009
Firstpage
2256
Lastpage
2260
Abstract
We study a fingerprinting game in which the collusion channel is unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders. Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maxmin games with mutual information as the payoff function. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution. If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprint alphabet is binary, we derive equations that can numerically solve the capacity game for arbitrary k. We also provide tight upper and lower bounds on the capacity. Finally, we discuss the asymptotic behavior of the fingerprinting game for large k and practical implementation issues.
Keywords
copy protection; copyright; game theory; security of data; collusion channel; fingerprinting capacity game; marking assumption; maximal coalition size; maxmin games sequence; saddle-point solution; saddle-point solutions; two-person zero-sum game; Computational complexity; Copyright protection; Decoding; Equations; Fingerprint recognition; Forgery; Law; Legal factors; Mutual information;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Theory, 2009. ISIT 2009. IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Seoul
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4312-3
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4313-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISIT.2009.5205882
Filename
5205882
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