Title :
Noninterference for a Practical DIFC-Based Operating System
Author :
Krohn, Maxwell ; Tromer, Eran
Author_Institution :
CyLab, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsbrugh, PA, USA
Abstract :
The Flume system is an implementation of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) at the operating system level. Prior work has shown Flume can be implemented as a practical extension to the Linux operating system, allowing real Web applications to achieve useful security guarantees. However, the question remains if the Flume system is actually secure. This paper compares Flume with other recent DIFC systems like Asbestos, arguing that the latter is inherently susceptible to certain wide-bandwidth covert channels, and proving their absence in Flume by means of a noninterference proof in the communicating sequential processes formalism.
Keywords :
Internet; Linux; operating systems (computers); security of data; Asbestos; Flume system; Linux operating system; Web applications; communicating sequential processes; decentralized information flow control; noninterference proof; practical DIFC-based operating system; Artificial intelligence; Communication system security; Control systems; Data security; Dynamic programming; Information security; Kernel; Linux; Operating systems; Privacy; Communicating Sequential Processes; Information flow control; covert channels; noninterference;
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy, 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Berkeley, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3633-0
