Title :
Restricted Shares Reducing, Market Reaction and the Optimum Strategy
Author :
Huang, Jianhuan ; Su, Rui
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Trade, Hunan Univ., Changsha, China
Abstract :
This paper decomposes market reaction to the release of restricted shares into early response and reducing effect, and constructs game theory model to make demonstration. The analysis found that it is the impact of reduction on stock price, expect cash yield rate and return rate of holding stock that decide the existence and stability of game equilibrium. In the decreasing market, the early response intensifies stock price fluctuation, which makes stock price fall sharply. It is also found that the equilibrium of the game is more likely to be (reducing, reducing) after the release date, and both originally tradable shareholders and restricted shareholders will choose the optimum reducing proportion to optimize their profits. When the relative scales of the tradable and restricted stocks are almost the same, the reduction of the two parties will be restrained by each other and equilibrium will be realized in some proportion, and there will be a self-steady mechanism of reducing reaction.
Keywords :
game theory; investment; profitability; share prices; stock markets; early response effect; game equilibrium; game theory model; investment; market reaction; optimum strategy; profit optimization; restricted shares reducing effect; self-steady mechanism; stability; stock price fluctuation; Fluctuations; Game theory; Information analysis; Large-scale systems; Portfolios; Pricing; Risk analysis; Stability analysis; Stock markets;
Conference_Titel :
Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, 2009. BIFE '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3705-4
DOI :
10.1109/BIFE.2009.163