• DocumentCode
    3037181
  • Title

    Credit Asymmetry of Buyers and Sellers in E-Commerce

  • Author

    Peng, Hui ; Tang, Pei

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    24-26 July 2009
  • Firstpage
    612
  • Lastpage
    615
  • Abstract
    This paper finds that e-commerce platform impose asymmetric measures on buyers and sellers. There are three reasons for the buyer-bias trading rules: First, seller has higher viscosity than the buyer in the E-commerce market where buyer has the option to trade; Second, buyer does exhibit a higher creditworthiness than buyer, as buyer has less method of cheating to choose, weaker position in trading mechanism, and people has an asymmetric perception toward the integrity of the seller and the buyer; Third, the loss incurred by buyer after being cheated is usually greater than that incurred by seller. The integrity choice model shows that sellers can get higher fraudulent return than buyers, data from Taobao shows that the sellerpsilas integrity degree is lower than buyerpsilas. Hence, asymmetry management on buyers and sellers can help to build the confidence of buyers and constraint the behavior of sellers on e-commerce platform.
  • Keywords
    electronic commerce; marketing; buyer-bias trading rules; buyers; credit asymmetry; e-commerce; integrity degree; sellers; Authentication; Conference management; Consumer protection; Contracts; Electronic commerce; Engineering management; Financial management; Identity management systems; Quality management; Viscosity; buyers and sellers; credit asymmetry; e-commerce;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, 2009. BIFE '09. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3705-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/BIFE.2009.144
  • Filename
    5208811