• DocumentCode
    3046548
  • Title

    Coalition formation in n-person stackelberg games

  • Author

    Bialas, W.F. ; Chew, M.N.

  • Author_Institution
    Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
  • fYear
    1982
  • fDate
    8-10 Dec. 1982
  • Firstpage
    669
  • Lastpage
    672
  • Abstract
    Stackelberg games and their resulting nonconvex programming problems have been used to model multilevel economic systems. These formulations have suggested that independent players, acting sequentially, may not produce Pareto-optimal decisions. Such systems naturally encourage the introduction of an n-player abstract game which permits coalitions of players to form. This paper examines the mathematical characteristics of these imbedded games and the implications of their solution for the overall problem.
  • Keywords
    Decision making; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Game theory; Government; Hierarchical systems; Industrial engineering; Mathematical model; Multilevel systems; Solid modeling;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Decision and Control, 1982 21st IEEE Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Orlando, FL, USA
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CDC.1982.268225
  • Filename
    4047328
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3046548