Differential Power Analysis resistance of Camellia and countermeasure strategy on FPGAs

Security devices are vulnerable to differential power analysis (DPA) that reveals the key by monitoring the power consumption of the circuits. In this paper, we present the first DPA attack against an FPGA implementation of the camellia encryption algorithm with all key sizes and evaluate the DPA resistance of the algorithm. The Camellia cryptographic algorithm involves several different key-dependent intermediate operations including S-Box operations. In previous research, it was believed that the Camellia is stronger than AES due to the additional Whitening phase protecting the S-Box operation. However, we propose an attack that bypasses the Whitening phase and targets the S-Box. In this paper, we also discuss a low-cost countermeasure strategy to protect the Pre-whitening / Post-whitening and FL function of Camellia using Dual-rail Precharged Logic and to protect against attacks of the S-Box using Random Delay Insertion.