Title :
A Stackelberg equilibrium for continuous-time differential games
Author_Institution :
University of Puerto Rico, R??o Piedras, Puerto Rico
Abstract :
The paper is concerned with the construction of Stackelberg strategies for differential continous-time leader-follower games, where the leader has access to the closed-loop information. The proposed approach utilizes the methodology of sequential strategies, developed originally for the zero-sum differential games, to derive a method for computing the upper bound for the leader´s payoffs and obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium.
Keywords :
Control theory; Delay; Feedback; Mathematics; Open loop systems; Sufficient conditions; Upper bound;
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control, 1983. The 22nd IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Antonio, TX, USA
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.1983.269606
