Title :
Secure multi-path data deliver in sensor networks
Author_Institution :
Arizona State Univ., Tempe, AZ, USA
Abstract :
In network communication, Byzantine attacks, i.e., attacks in consequence of the packet dropping and cheating (modified packets), are usually difficult to guard against. Several multi-path packet routing schemes have been recently proposed to recover lost packets on account of the packet dropping (caused by path failures or attacks), but no effective solutions have been proposed to counter cheating attacks. To this end, we propose a novel approach in multi-path routing to improve resilience to Byzantine attacks. In our approach, we present a multi-path source routing scheme based on Pru¿fer number which allows the receiver to identify packet dropping paths. We also propose a multi-path coding scheme based on Reed-Solomon error-correcting coding scheme which allows the receiver to identify paths that cheat. If (n; k) RS coding scheme is used, our v( ¿ 3) node-disjoint paths routing scheme is resilient to t = (n-k)/2 faulty paths, i.e., up to t faulty paths can be identified and the original message can be recovered. Our scheme does not involve interactive communications between the source and the destination. Additionally, we propose a path selection scheme which enables a node to select the most reliable paths (isolating faulty nodes) to transmit data. Our robustness analysis also discusses the tradeoffs between using the single path routing and multi-path routing.
Keywords :
Reed-Solomon codes; error correction codes; telecommunication network routing; telecommunication security; wireless sensor networks; Byzantine attacks; Reed-Solomon error correcting coding scheme; cheating attacks; multipath packet routing schemes; network communication; packet dropping; secure multipath data deliver; sensor networks; Counting circuits; Decoding; Encoding; Fault diagnosis; Intelligent networks; Reed-Solomon codes; Resilience; Robustness; Routing; Telecommunication network reliability;
Conference_Titel :
Military Communications Conference, 2009. MILCOM 2009. IEEE
Conference_Location :
Boston, MA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5238-5
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5239-2
DOI :
10.1109/MILCOM.2009.5379954