Title :
A fast automaton-based method for detecting anomalous program behaviors
Author :
Sekar, R. ; Bendre, M. ; Dhurjati, D. ; Bollineni, P.
Author_Institution :
State Univ. of New York, Stony Brook, NY, USA
Abstract :
Anomaly detection on system call sequences has become perhaps the most successful approach for detecting novel intrusions. A natural way for learning sequences is to use a finite-state automaton (FSA). However previous research indicates that FSA-learning is computationally expensive, that it cannot be completely automated or that the space usage of the FSA may be excessive. We present a new approach that overcomes these difficulties. Our approach builds a compact FSA in a fully automatic and efficient manner, without requiring access to source code for programs. The space requirements for the FSA is low - of the order of a few kilobytes for typical programs. The FSA uses only a constant time per system call during the learning as well as the detection period. This factor leads to low overheads for intrusion detection. Unlike many of the previous techniques, our FSA-technique can capture both short term and long term temporal relationships among system calls, and thus perform more accurate detection. This enables our approach to generalize and predict future behaviors from past behaviors. As a result, the training periods needed for our FSA based approach are shorter. Moreover false positives are reduced without increasing the likelihood of missing attacks. This paper describes our FSA based technique and presents a comprehensive experimental evaluation of the technique
Keywords :
finite state machines; learning automata; security of data; system monitoring; FSA-learning; anomalous program behavior detection; constant time per system call; fast automaton-based method; finite-state automaton; intrusion detection; learning sequences; system calls; training periods; Intrusion detection; Learning automata;
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy, 2001. S&P 2001. Proceedings. 2001 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Oakland, CA
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1046-9
DOI :
10.1109/SECPRI.2001.924295